










he concept of a “new economy” gained enor-
mous attention in the late 1990s with the US
boom which, late in the business cycle, occurred
with a virtual absence of inflationary pressure and
at levels of unemployment far below what used to
be viewed as compatible with price stability. US
monetary policy adjusted to a partly new set of
conditions.More recently,the concept has taken on
rather different connotations as the value of tech-
nology stocks has crumbled along with a general
economic downturn.What then was the new econ-
omy concept built on, and is it of any lasting rele-
vance?
In terms of macroeconomic performance, the US
surge of the 1990s was truly spectacular.The dura-
tion of the boom outlasted any previous experi-
ence, and unemployment fell to about 4 percent
without giving rise to inflationary pressures.
Although it had already attained the highest pro-
ductivity levels in most respects,the United States
further increased its gap to most other countries.
There were signs of dynamism elsewhere as well.
Central banks around the world sensed the pres-
ence of change in micro-macro relationships and
there was talk of an enhanced potential for long-
term growth. However, there never was evidence
of any general uptake in productivity growth. Of
course, growth may now be more difficult to mea-
sure, e.g. as the service sector has become more
prominent and because of rapid quality improve-
ments and shifts towards new products. The fact
remains that, as far as we can measure, irrespec-
tive of whether one controls for the cycle or not,
only about a fourth of the OECD countries dis-
played higher growth rates in the 1990s on aver-
age than they did in the previous decades.The US
belonged to this group, but its record was actually
only marginally better than it had been in the
1980s.
The concept of a “new economy” was in any case
doomed from the start. What is “new” today will
be “old” tomorrow, and what could be viewed as
“new” in the first place appears a philosophical
rather than an economic question.2 What does
matter is to what extent, and in which respects,
significant changes are occurring in the funda-
mentals of growth, and what these entail for indi-
vidual countries. This applies not least to the EU,
which belongs to the most advanced economic
regions of the world but has experienced general-
ly sluggish growth for decades. Partly building on
recent work at the OECD (OECD, 2001a; OECD,
2001b), this article offers some reflections on
these issues.
Patterns of growth
An examination of growth performance in OECD
countries, and how it has evolved in recent years,
indicates that two types of major changes are
indeed taking place. One is in the area of growth
patterns. Since World War II, countries at initially
lower income levels have generally been observed
to grow faster, i.e. they are “catching up” through
learning effects and the transfer of technologies
from those countries that are leading the race
(Fagerberg, 1994). Broadly speaking, however, the
spread of growth rates in GDP increased across the
OECD in the 1990s, as some of the leaders surged
further ahead. Within the EU the trend was more
varied, with growth picking up in several small,
fairly advanced countries, notably Denmark,
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ing in France, Germany and Italy.Towards the end
of the decade, Finland, Iceland and Sweden also
experienced a revival in growth.
With respect to the composition of growth, it is
true that traditional considerations such as labour
utilisation – and unemployment – remained impor-
tant in the 1990s. In the United States, the number
of persons employed grew by 1.3% a year over the
1990s,a level matched only by the Netherlands and
Ireland among the countries in the EU. Whether
countries grew rapidly or not, however, the largest
part of growth in per capita income came from
higher labour productivity, which depends on capi-
tal deepening, i.e. the services provided by capital
to each worker, and on multi-factor productivity
(MFP).3 Capital deepening played a significant
role in the 1990s, but occurred in a limited number
of sectors. Despite measurement problems, MFP
stood out as the most important determinant of
labour productivity growth. This was increasingly
so towards the end of the decade, and precisely in
that rather small group of countries whose perfor-
mance rose markedly from already high productiv-
ity levels.
ICT in growth
The other significant change concerns the factors
in growth. It has long been recognised that tradi-
tional investment and labour input could explain
only a minor part of the overall variation in growth
rates. Solow (1957) lumped together the remaining
factors in a residual referred to as “technical
progress”, viewed by many as a black box of unde-
fined, exogenously determined factors.While some
studies showed the importance of better measure-
ment of the various inputs of growth (Jorgenson
and Griliches, 1967), and other work, such as the
“new growth theory” (Romer, 1990) explicitly
sought to unravel endogenously determined
processes, the problem of capturing the fundamen-
tal determinants of growth has remained, and in
some respects has become even more difficult to
solve. Psacharoulos (1994) found that a sizeable
share of cross-country variation in growth perfor-
mance over the last decades could be put down to
education. In the 1990s, however, several studies
(Barro and Lee, 1996; Nehru et al., 1995) cast
doubt on the robustness of this relationship.
Solow’s remarks in the 1970s that information and
communications technology (ICT) seemed observ-
able “everywhere except in the productivity statis-
tics” might thus not have been surprising. In recent
years, however, the focus on the evasive influence
of ICT was replaced by a conviction that it played
a major role in an acceleration of US productivity
growth which gave rise both to higher employment
and lower inflation. New data and methodologies
suggested that the impacts came not only out of
production, but from the use of ICT as well
(Ohliner and Sichel, 2000; Whelan, 2000). Mean-
while, a first cross-country examination controlling
for differences in measurement methodologies
(Schreyer, 2000), found an increasing impact of
ICT investment on output growth during the 1990s
in all G7 countries. In Canada, the United King-
dom and the United States, ICT equipment was
responsible for about half of the entire growth con-
tribution of fixed capital during 1990–96. In
France,Germany and Japan,the effect was smaller,
but remained significant. The fast pace of ICT
investment brought widespread substitution for
other kinds of investment, implying a rise in the
marginal returns to other production factors. On
the other hand, and although evidence from sever-
al countries indicates that the underlying produc-
tivity growth has remained strong in the subse-
quent downturn, there can be no doubt that, in ret-
rospect, some of that investment in ICT turned out
not to be well spent.
There has been much discussion about whether the
impacts of ICT are on a par with what was
observed in earlier “technological revolutions”,
such as those of the railways or electricity.
Kranzberg (1985) noted that the development of
new technology is always evolutionary in the sense
that its point of departure is existing technology.A
technological “revolution” is characterised by a
series of complementary innovations accompanied
by processes of social and institutional adaptation.
David (1990) and Freeman and Perez (1990)
argued that, in the past, such revolutions were
characterised by stepwise developments in which
productivity growth remained low for many
decades – generally half a century or more – before
taking off. ICT may be viewed as fitting this pat-
tern, since partial impacts have been observed for
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growth was identified only in
the late 1990s. For various rea-
sons, ICT may gradually come
to exert a more rapidly accu-
mulating impact than what has
been seen in connection with
new technologies in the past.
There has clearly been an
unprecedented fall in prices
and increases in quality. Also,
ICT is diffused with greater
speed, particularly through the
Internet, creating a potential
for rapid network growth with
associated externalities. Effects
may become visible once cer-
tain thresholds of use have
been passed. On the other hand, sceptics (Gordon,
2000) argue that ICT and the Internet have little
content of their own and merely replace other
technologies.
Complementary factors
While ICT appears to have a potential for significant
reduction of transaction costs in markets and bottle-
necks in economies, this impact may not be readily
available. Above all, some aspects, such as the
Internet and electronic commerce, are still in their
infancy. Internationally agreed and transparent regu-
latory conditions need to be put in place and be
implemented in order to enable secure transactions
and well-functioning markets.4 Apart from such
direct influences, the effect of ICT so far has been
interrelated with the structural changes in labour
markets which took place notably in the US but to a
varying extent elsewhere as well.
Likewise, regulatory reforms in
financial and product markets,
along with globalisation, in-
creased competition, pushed
restructuring and put downward
pressure on prices.This occurred
in most OECD countries,includ-
ing in the EU, but more so in
some than in others.
Innovation and technological
change more broadly must fur-
ther be taken into account. The selective accelera-
tion of MFP in the 1990s provides indications of
what has occurred. Examining the correlation
between the growth in MFP and that in the PC
base across countries for the 1990s, as illustrated in
Figure 1, a strongly significant relationship
emerges. Countries found high up along the verti-
cal axis include both those with large ICT-produc-
ing sectors, such as Finland and the United States,
and those with almost no such production, notably
Australia. As illustrated by Figure 2, however,
there is a positive relationship also between R&D
and MFP growth.5 Furthermore, rather than aggre-
gate R&D, it is important to consider innovation,
and how different elements interact in shaping
innovative capacity.Noteworthy changes are under
Figure 1
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(cf. Bassanini et al., 2000).way in the composition and funding of R&D, and
in the linkages to innovation (Guellec and van
Pottelsberghe, 2000). In the United States, the pub-
lic research sector, and particularly universities,
have played a major role in the overall surge in
patenting – one indicator of the output of innova-
tion. On the other hand, with the improved means
of communication, the linkages from research
through to marketing have evolved in both direc-
tions,providing a potential for more market-driven
innovation processes,including in services (OECD,
2001d).
Meanwhile, education and skills remain essential.
De la Fuente and Dmenech (2000) argue that the
impact of human capital on economic growth prob-
ably has risen over time, but that understanding its
role requires a better handle on the linkages to
technical progress. Firm-level studies have found
evidence of complementarity between technologi-
cal change and human capital accumulation
(Brynjolfsson et al., 1998). A number of surveys
point to far-reaching organisational change within
firms and workplaces in the 1990s towards flatter
hierarchical structures, greater responsibility for
individual workers, multiple tasks and stronger
incentives for innovation,flexibility and on-the-job
training. Such organisational change can serve as a
crucial complement to R&D, ICT or investment in
training (Black and Lynch, 2000; Bresnahan et al.,
1999). With the key assets increasingly becoming
intangible, however, appropriate evaluation and
disclosure along with conditions that allow for
effective risk-taking become essential. The provi-
sion of venture capital, which typically is superior
to bank lending in funding new business and new
growth areas, increased strongly in almost all
OECD countries in the late 1990s, but the US mar-
ket has the greatest depth and accumulated experi-
ence.Also,many countries retain severe barriers to
entry and exit of firms, and to entrepreneurship,
locking resources into existing operations.
While capturing the benefits from the new growth
factors thus will depend on a number of areas, a
break down of trade, industry, or production statis-
tics underscores that fundamental changes are
under way. As seen in Figure 3, there has been a
consistent expansion of the share of high-technolo-
gy products in international manufacturing trade.
An examination of industrial trends in the OECD
area shows that those industries which are inten-
sive in their use of technology and human skills
have consistently increased their share of overall
value added and production over the last decades
(OECD, 2001c). Meanwhile, services –notably
high-value-added services – are rapidly increasing
their share of the economy.There seems to be less
and less room to make a living out of specialisation
based on low cost, and standardised production.
While these trends were evident for quite some
time before the pick-up of MFP-growth, the latter
appears to have resulted where the most effective
application of the new growth factors was taking
place in the 1990s. The proliferation of knowledge
and technology seems certain to remain with us
beyond the short-term swings of the cycle, and the
ability to respond to the opportunities as well as
the challenges that it brings is likely to become
increasingly essential.
The EU position
Monetary and budgetary poli-
cies undoubtedly go some way
to explain the performance of
the US in the late 1990s, which
now might be seen as a classic
example of a ”bubble econo-
my”(Cooper et al.,1999).There
were substantial macroeconom-
ic imbalances in the form of an
expanding current account
deficit, negative savings and the
build-up of foreign positions in
US securities and equities
















prices”. However, the wealth creation in equity
markets, especially in technology sectors, explains
neither the level and exceptional duration of the
US productivity record, nor can it help explain the
varying performances of other economies such as
Australia, the Nordic region, or in continental
Europe.
ICT is one area where the United States clearly
holds the leading position.The Table shows a com-
pelling US lead over the EU (and Japan) in most
respects, although mobile users are an exception.
One aspect – which is not easily measured – con-
cerns the extent to which firms adopt ICT in a
proactive and strategic way. There are indications
that European firms are less aware of the need for
a formal e-commerce strategy (PFA Research,
1999),as reflected in the absence of any correlation
between use of the Internet and the adoption of a
formal e-commerce strategy by European firms. In
fact, there appears to be a slightly negative corre-
lation between the rate of Internet adoption and
the firm’s perception that e-commerce plays a
strategic role in their company.With the exception
of the Nordic countries, and on the basis of a
restricted sample, firms in European countries
such as the Netherlands, Spain and the United
Kingdom have been found to view electronic com-
merce as of relatively low strategic importance
(OECD, 2001b).
While Europe lags behind the United States, the
overall situation masks great variation. Those EU
countries that are less advanced in ICT,
i.e. Greece, Italy and Spain, have recently under-
taken heavy investment in business-to-business
electronic commerce, and show signs of catching
up.The Nordic countries and the United Kingdom
are advanced in regard to PC penetration, number
of Internet hosts per inhabitant or use of the
Internet for commerce.6The penetration of mobile
users, which exceeds two-thirds of the population
in the Nordic region,is widely viewed as providing
the EU with an edge in the start-up of mobile
commerce. Related areas in which the EU may
also enjoy an advantage vis-à-vis the United States
include digital TV and methods for more secure
communication, e.g. smart cards or the use of
mobile telephones for identification.However,the
development of the third generation of mobile
networks, gradually under way, will exert a major
impact on the preconditions for mobile commerce.
Technologies,as well as institutions and regulatory
conditions, are changing fast, and the scope for
genuine competition will be decisive for the abili-
ty of producers and service providers to respond.
Europe is still plagued by rather severe segmenta-
tion in terms of national markets, limiting genuine
competition on a wider basis.The reliance on pre-
paid users in most of the EU raises challenges with
respect to applying effective price strategies for
3G mobile services and, unless there is an increase
in competition, the required innovation may be
slow in coming. The EU has already forfeited the
lead in roaming, with costs coming down more
quickly in North America than in Europe, and
there are signs that US operators have become
more active than European ones in developing
new solutions for bringing
down the price of Internet
access via wireless. Further, the
wave of auctioning access to
third-generation networks on a
national basis in the EU
amounted to a substantial tax
on future investment in this
area, which tapped the supply
of risky investment by turning
it into public rents and raised
the already high risks confront-
ed by the industry.
These are merely a few illustra-
tions of the prevailing mixture
Indicators of e-commerce readiness: Japan, Europe, United States
Japan European United 
Union States
Internet hosts per 1 000 inhabitants 
Oct 2000 32.6 37.4 234.2
Secure servers per million inhabitants 
July 2001 62.8 65.3 315
Installed PC base per 100 inhabitants 1999 25 23 65
PCs per 100 white collar workers 1999 43 36 98
Employees using e-commerce enabling 
technologies 1999 (percentage) 60 49
a) 65
ICT expenditure/GDP (percentage) 1999 8.0 6.4 7.9
ICT in business sector R&D 
(percentage) 1999 31 19 22
Cellular mobile subscribers 
(percentage) 1999 45 40 30
a) Average of France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
Source: (2000i) and OECD Telecommunications database 2000. Host data from the
Internet Software Consortium; secure Web servers data from Netcraft.
6 See European Commission (1999) for
detailed cross-country comparisons.of opportunities and obstacles in the EU. In terms
of actual performance, it is particularly the larger
continental European countries that now appear
stagnant, whereas several of the small relatively
advanced EU states have demonstrated new signs
of dynamism, indicating that size need not be the
issue. But while the EU still belongs to the most
advanced and dynamic regions in many respects, a
number of barriers continue to hamper restructur-
ing, risk-taking and new products or businesses.7
With the new growth factors, the potential for
global reach is bigger than ever,but so are the costs
of rigidities and compartmentalisation.There is no
doubt a remaining challenge for the European
Commission as well as for the individual European
Member states to progress in a more consistent
and mutually reinforcing manner. There is a need
of a more comprehensive strategy encompassing
the key policy areas which together impinge on the
incentives for capturing the benefits of the new
growth factors, as was envisioned at the Lisbon
Summit. As part of this, policy makers need to
ensure  – and publicly demonstrate – that ICT
brings with it reduced prices, new services and
skills upgrading, and that the benefits are spread
broadly throughout society. This has to include
addressing the social consequences that arise when
some firms, and some jobs, are downgraded or
destroyed by rapid technological and organisation-
al change, while others prosper and new ones are
born. It will be increasingly important, however,
not to address these concerns in a way that com-
promises the incentives and options to learn,invest
and innovate.
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